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The United StatesIndia nuclear agreement, announced in 2005, was a first step
in the process to normalise India’s international nuclear relations despite the fact
that India is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons. Africa is largely seen as a uranium supplier rather than nuclear power
producer in the world nuclear order. The position that African states take towards
AfricaIndia nuclear cooperation, uranium supply to India in particular, is
informed by two seemingly contrasting factors, namely economic and political
pragmatism on the one hand, and non-proliferation imperatives and norms on
the other. The African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, also referred to as the
Pelindaba Treaty, prohibits uranium and nuclear-related exports to states without
comprehensive safeguards of their nuclear facilities, but the case of India is still
open for interpretation. Africa and India’s shared post-colonial consciousness,
manifesting in their historical ties, membership of the Non-Aligned Movement
and SouthSouth cooperation, is often regarded as another factor facilitating
AfricaIndia nuclear relations. A more critical view points to the different notions
of post-coloniality in Africa and India, resulting in different approaches to
nuclear non-proliferation that constrain their nuclear relations.
Keywords: nuclear relations; non-proliferation treaty; India; Africa; Pelindaba
Treaty
Introduction
In a joint statement on 18 July 2005, former US President George W. Bush and
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced a bilateral agreement that
would normalise nuclear cooperation between their respective countries. Nuclear
cooperation between the two had been restricted in 1974 and again in 1998 when
India, a state that had not joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, or simply the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), tested nuclear weapons.
Since the 2005 announcement of the bilateral agreement, however, a number of states
and international organisations such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) have
followed the United States’ lead, effectively bending the rules governing nuclear trade
to normalise nuclear relations with India.
This article is directed at the question: What is the position of African states since
the entry into force of the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, signed at
Cairo in 1996, on the normalisation of nuclear relations with India, and what
determines this position? In particular, it reflects on the tension between economic
pragmatism and non-proliferation imperatives informing the African position, but
argues that this tension is mediated by a third determinant, namely a post-colonial
identity. This contribution is not an attempt to review the literature on international
South African Journal of International Affairs
Vol. 18, No. 3, December 2011, 319339
ISSN 1022-0461 print/ISSN 1938-0275 online
# 2011 The South African Institute of International Affairs
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2011.622948
http://www.tandfonline.com
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 W
es
ter
n C
ap
e],
 [J
oe
lie
n P
ret
or
ius
] a
t 0
1:5
7 2
2 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
12
 
norms; however, it does assume that non-proliferation norms matter and recognises
that when states choose to stretch or change them, they usually find justifications for
doing so that go beyond realist interpretations of national interests.1
The article is also written with the aim to contribute to critical debate on uranium
politics in Africa, which would tie into the literature cautioning against a second
scramble for Africa as a result of the ‘rise’ of the Tiger (India) and the Dragon
(China) in Africa, and globally.2
India and the first grand nuclear bargain
In almost Shakespearean fashion the background narrative to this article starts with
a ‘grand bargain’ negotiated in the late 1960s and codified in the NPT (1970).3
Nuclear weapon states (states that had tested nuclear weapons by 1967) agreed not to
provide non-nuclear weapon states (states that had not tested nuclear weapons by
1967) with nuclear weapons or facilitate the development of these weapons, and also
to give up their own nuclear weapons in the future (nuclear disarmament). In turn,
non-nuclear weapon states promised not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons.
The inducement to give up the right to have nuclear weapons came in the form of
legal assurance to non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT of an entitlement
(an ‘inalienable right’) to civil nuclear technology. Thus, the grand bargain confirmed
and codified a nuclear export norm originating in US law in the 1950s, namely to
restrict nuclear exports, in the name of nuclear weapons non-proliferation, to
peaceful purposes only.4 To ensure the implementation of this norm, suppliers of
nuclear technology and material may export only to states with full-scope
(or comprehensive) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards of
their nuclear programmes (Article III of the NPT). Safeguards include inspections
and other verification measures to account for nuclear material.5
States that have not acceded to the NPT, which are Israel, Pakistan, and India,
plus North Korea which joined and then withdrew, are denied this entitlement
to nuclear technology for two reasons. Firstly, and on principle, because they did
not agree to the grand bargain with the NPT members and proceeded to develop
nuclear weapons, they cannot claim any privileges under the NPT; allowing them
access to nuclear technology would undermine the grand bargain and may send a
message to other non-nuclear weapon states that there would be no repercussions for
leaving the NPT and acquiring nuclear weapons.6 Secondly, and more practically,
these states do not have full-scope IAEA safeguards that would ensure that nuclear
material is used only for civilian purposes and is not diverted to their military
programmes.
Successive Indian leaders have chosen not to sign onto the NPT. India’s position
is often justified by referring to security concerns related to its adversarial relations
with its northern neighbours, China and Pakistan. Indeed, India has fought wars
with both these states. China tested nuclear weapons in 1964, two years after it
defeated India in a border war, making it possible for China to join the NPT as a
nuclear weapon state in 1992. China’s initial refusal to join the NPT and its nuclear
cooperation with Pakistan later (to which the guardians of non-proliferation largely
turned a blind eye), did much to strengthen arguments in the domestic debate that
had been waging in India since the 1950s that India should keep its options to
acquire nuclear weapons open.7 Moreover, the disappointing response to India’s
request for explicit security assurances (that nuclear weapon states would not use or
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threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states) conveyed by a
high-profile delegation to all the nuclear weapon states in 1968, also informed India’s
decision not to join the NPT.8
Although India’s security concerns make for a powerful basis on which to
reject the NPT and eventually acquire nuclear weapons, they are not convincing as
the main motive for India’s current nuclear stance. By India’s own admission,
as conveyed in a 1995 submission to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) when
the latter considered the legality of the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict:
‘Nuclear weapons cannot be used in self defence . . . nuclear weapons cause . . .
destruction which far exceeds the measure of proportionality and the object of
destruction necessary and relevant to the attainment of military objectives.’9
India’s leaders have always maintained that no state should have nuclear
weapons, but if any state has, India must have the same right too.10 The nuclear
weapon states’ thwarting of their nuclear disarmament obligations under Article VI
of the NPT did much to support India’s claim that the NPT is an instrument of those
states that had tested nuclear weapons before 1967 to freeze an unfair nuclear order
in their favour.11 The term ‘nuclear apartheid’ was first coined by Indian negotiators
at the NPT deliberations in the 1960s to describe this state of affairs, and has often
been employed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to justify India’s nuclear stance
post-1998.12
However, nothing in India’s nuclear policy today suggests that India would prefer
a world where all states are entitled to nuclear weapons. Rather, India seems to view
nuclear weapons as a symbol of great power status to which it holds a claim.13
Manmohan Singh reversed India’s position toward the NPT in 2009, stating that
India would join the NPT, but as a nuclear weapon state.14 It thus seems that India
views the NPT as somehow knighting the nuclear weapon states as ‘responsible’
enough to have nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapon status as second tier.15
This is not contrary to the nuclear weapon states’ own interpretation of the NPT and
the rationale that the Bush administration provided for the USIndia agreement to
win over domestic and international audiences.16
Although India has remained outside a number of nuclear non-proliferation
treaties, it has not proliferated ‘horizontally’ in the sense that Israel, North Korea
and Pakistan have been accused of doing.17 Horizontal proliferation refers to the
transfer of nuclear weapons or material to another state or non-state entity, whereas
vertical proliferation is the expansion or renovation of a nuclear weapon state’s own
arsenal.This sets India apart from other de facto nuclear weapon states and grounds
India’s self-image as a ‘responsible nuclear weapon state’ that should enjoy the
prestige and privileges of the other nuclear weapon states.
India diverted nuclear technology acquired from the United States, France and
Canada to its military sector and tested weapons twice: in 1974 and in 1998.18
The 1974 test led to the suspension of all nuclear cooperation with India and
sanctions, and it was under US pressure that Prime Minister Indira Ghandi cancelled
another test she had planned for 1983.19 India’s 1998 tests were again followed by US
and international condemnation. The Clinton administration recalled its ambassa-
dor from India and relations between the countries reached a post-Cold War low.
India rekindled USIndia relations as soon as possible, however, realising that
‘in order to gain global recognition India needed to be recognised as a legitimate
nuclear weapons state and in order to do this, relations with the US needed to be
mended.’20
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India and the Nuclear Suppliers Group
By 2011, India is widely perceived as a rising global power, often compared with
China. Attributed to the financial reforms instituted by Manmohan Singh and
India’s impressive information technology sector that expanded rapidly after the
Cold War, the nation’s rise is characterised by high economic growth, increased
foreign trade and investment, and increased household income.21 Coupled with its
population size (at 1.2 billion, second only to China’s), however, India’s rapid
development has resulted in formidable energy challenges. India’s policymakers are
thus pursuing all sources of energy provision, not least nuclear energy. In this regard,
the Indian nuclear energy market has become a coveted sector for international
exporters and investors.22
The most prominent international forum for the cultivation of nuclear export
controls is the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which was formed in 1975 and has a
membership now numbering 46 nuclear technology and material supplier states.23
The NSG’s self-imposed mission is to align ‘the interrelated objectives of preventing
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the promotion of international trade and
co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.’24 The NSG’s creation and phases
of growth were spurred on by cases where nuclear exports for peaceful purposes were
diverted to military purposes. It is not by accident that the NSG was formed
subsequent to India testing a nuclear weapon in 1974 * a test made possible by
diverting civilian technology sourced internationally to military purposes. Subse-
quently, when the extent of Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme, which grew under the
guise of peaceful purposes, became known in the wake of the first Gulf War in 1991,
the NSG experienced a revival. In practice, the NSG makes rules by consensus on
what ‘dual-use’ technologies may or may not be exported (compiling a ‘trigger list’),
and also to whom.25 The NSG guidelines for nuclear exports correspond with the
NPT’s requirement for nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapon states, namely that
recipient states must allow full-scope safeguards on their nuclear facilities.26
India’s second grand nuclear bargain: The 2005 USIndia nuclear agreement
The 2005 Bush/Singh announcement of a bilateral cooperation plan between the
United States and India included nuclear energy and implied the normalisation
of nuclear trade between the two countries. With this agreement, the United States
labelled India as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology that should
be given the same benefits and responsibilities as other such states. In essence, the
Bush administration had recognised India as a nuclear weapon state.27 More
specifically, the United States conferred this status upon India by promising to work
toward full civil energy cooperation, seeking agreement to amend US laws and
policies, to amend international regimes to enable civil nuclear energy cooperation
and trade with India, and to encourage the normalisation of nuclear energy
relations with India by US partners and in other forums. The latter includes the
International Thermonuclear Energy Reactor (ITER) project, which explores
nuclear fusion for energy production. On the Indian side, Prime Minister Singh
committed India to the following: identifying and separating civilian and military
nuclear facilities and notifying the IAEA of civilian facilities, which would also
be placed under voluntary IAEA safeguards and the IAEA Additional Protocol;
continuing a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; cooperating with the
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United States towards a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty; refraining from
exporting enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states not in possession of
these technologies, and joining international efforts to limit their dissemination
including through comprehensive export control legislation and through adherence
to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the NSG guidelines.28
The agreement was received in a positive light by some. Mohammed ElBaradei,
Nobel Laureate and former director-general of the IAEA, suggested that the
normalisation of nuclear trade with India under certain conditions would bring India
into the non-proliferation regime, albeit without joining the NPT.29 The IAEA
subsequently negotiated a ‘type 66 safeguard agreement’ with India that would cover
India’s civilian nuclear facilities, but not its military nuclear facilities. Under the
agreement, India will put additional civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards to
comply with the conditions that would allow the IAEA members to provide India
with access to the international nuclear fuel market. The agreement also makes clear
that India can ‘take corrective measures’ should international fuel supply for its
civilian reactors be disrupted.30 It has been argued that these unspecified corrective
measures could include unilateral withdrawal of civilian facilities from IAEA
safeguards should India’s access to nuclear fuel be suspended, for instance in
response to an Indian nuclear test.31
The agreement with the IAEA is not a full-scope safeguards agreement, because
it excludes India’s military nuclear facilities. For this reason, the NSG had to make
an exception to its rules to allow its members to export nuclear material to India. The
NSG passed a ‘once-off ’ waiver to its rules that would allow normalisation of
nuclear trade with India under certain conditions, for example assurance of a
unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. The NSG waiver was a precondition for
the USIndia agreement to be passed by the US Congress. Other states have followed
suit after the NSG exception was granted, for example Canada, France and Russia
have all concluded separate agreements to normalise nuclear trade with India.
To reach the point at which the NSG agreed to the waiver was no easy route.
Although some NSG members saw the economic benefits of nuclear cooperation
with India for their own nuclear industries, others asked tough questions about the
precedent that the waiver would be setting. These NSG members would probably not
have acquiesced to the waiver without intense US and Indian lobbying, recognition
of India’s past horizontal non-proliferation record, and India’s assurance of a
nuclear testing moratorium.32
The USIndia agreement has nevertheless caused a storm in the non-
proliferation and arms control community. Their concern is that the agreement
undermines the nuclear non-proliferation regime by watering down nuclear export
restrictions. By allowing uranium exports to India for civilian uses, the agreement
frees up India’s domestic nuclear fuel stocks for military use. They also argue that
bending the rules for India will induce an arms race in the region as Pakistan and
China increase their nuclear arsenals in response to increased Indian capacity. It is
feared that the agreement sends ‘the wrong message’ to would-be proliferators that
there are no lasting consequences for disregarding the non-proliferation regime.
Or, worse, normalising nuclear relations with India could be perceived as a double
standard favouring US allies, and serve as a precedent for similarly recognising and
legitimising Israel’s nuclear weapon status.33
The foregoing narrative on the USIndia nuclear agreement, describing how it
involved the IAEA and the NSG and the concerns it raises, is by no means a
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comprehensive account. Rather, it is an overview to arrive at an understanding of the
significance of exploring AfricaIndia nuclear cooperation. Similar to other states in
other regions, African states individually or collectively will be adopting a position
on the normalisation of nuclear relations with India. If foreign policymaking is
interpreted as a rational choice process that involves a costbenefit analysis of ‘to
normalise or not to normalise nuclear trade’, the scales would be weighed down by
economic pragmatism, on the one hand, and non-proliferation imperatives on the
other. The next section will explore the tension between these often competing
factors.
AfricaIndia nuclear cooperation: Economic pragmatism and the political-economy of
global uranium supply
A report by the World Nuclear Association (WNA) notes that India intends to
provide 25% of its electricity supply via nuclear energy by 2050.34 Even contemplat-
ing this dramatic increase in nuclear energy production in India is only possible
because the normalisation of nuclear trade includes access to uranium sources
outside India. Prior to the NSG waiver, India was suffering severe uranium
shortages, already referred to as ‘a major problem’ in 2005.35 By 2007, the uranium
stockpiled prior to the spike in India’s energy needs was nearing depletion. India’s
domestic uranium mining capacity was estimated at about 300 tons per year, while its
civil and military needs were estimated at 600 tons per year in 2007.36 The state-
owned Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) puts India’s uranium
needs at 8 000 tons of uranium per year by 2035, a 10 fold increase from the current
situation.37 However, due to health and environmental concerns, opening new
uranium mines in India has been met with domestic resistance.38
This is where Africa fits into the picture * as a uranium supplier with close to
20% of the world’s recoverable uranium.39 Namibia, Niger and South Africa have an
estimated 94% of the uranium on the continent and these countries, along with
smaller potential suppliers, such as Malawi, are well-positioned to meet India’s
uranium needs.40 In fact, prior to the NSG waiver, India had already courted African
states for uranium mining and exploration agreements as an alternative to supply
from Canada, Australia and Kazakhstan (all of them NSG members that were
not allowed to sell uranium to India at the time).41 In 2007 an Indian company won
a tender for uranium exploration in Niger, a milestone for a state so isolated in the
nuclear order. The Hindu, one of India’s largest daily newspapers, reported on the
tender victory as follow: ‘Niger is not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
the 45-member nation that controls all nuclear-related commerce, and hence it
should be easy for India to access the uranium once the mines become operational*
this will take several years.’42 Officials in Niger hailed the granting of mining permits
to Indian (and Chinese) companies by saying that it would end France’s monopoly
on uranium mining in that country.43 Similar agreements or intentions for such
agreements followed from Gabon in 2008,44 Namibia in 200945 and Malawi in
2010.46
The NSG waiver has of course made it easier for India to obtain uranium, but
the African mining and prospecting agreements are still significant and a deliberate
strategy of India to ensure future uranium supply. The NPCIL’s finance director
was quoted as saying that the company’s strategy is to ‘buy stakes in mines and tie up
the source of supply’.47Although evidence of any official Indian request to the
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South African government to buy uranium is elusive, Indian press reports claim that
the NPCIL has considered taking up an offer of minority stakes in four African
uranium mines owned by Areva SA, the African arm of the French state-owned
nuclear power company.48
Allowing Indian investment in uranium mining, and consequently access to
Africa’s uranium, is regarded as an economically pragmatic position on the issue of
normalisation of nuclear cooperation with India, based on the economic benefits
that would flow from this. However, the fungibility of uranium also drives a
pragmatic approach.49 Even if African states decide to block India from direct access
to its uranium, India may still benefit indirectly from African uranium on the world
market. For instance, through a tripartite agreement Russia, the United States and
France have committed to provide life-time fuel supply for reactors sold to India.
Russia and France are both major uranium mining states in Africa and could thus
use uranium sourced from their African mining endeavours for this end.50 Even if
African states exercise their prerogative to prohibit these countries from exporting
African-sourced uranium to India as a requirement of third party assurance from a
recipient state, the African uranium entering the world market will free up uranium
from other countries that have nuclear cooperation agreements with India. Sandy
Gordon avers, for example, that Australia’s decision not to sell uranium to India will
have little material effect on India’s access to uranium so long as India is accorded
access to world markets and Australia continues to sell into those markets.51
Not all African states have opted for the pragmatic approach outlined above.
Reminded that the Manhattan Project (which resulted in the bombs dropped on
Japan in the 1940s) was largely fuelled by uranium from the Shinkolobwe mine in
what is today the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), African states are
aware of the dual use of their uranium. Some African states are concerned about the
precedent that the Indian case sets for non-proliferation and disarmament.
On principle therefore, African states may decide not to normalise nuclear relations
with India, guided by their obligations under the NPT, the Pelindaba Treaty, and
their domestic legislation.
Africa’s non-proliferation imperatives and the Pelindaba Treaty
The Pelindaba Treaty52 stands out as the legal instrument to guide an African
position on normalisation of nuclear relations with India for two reasons.
Firstly, among African states only South Africa is a member of the NSG, thus
the India waiver (which NSG members see as superseding their NPT obligations)
would be applicable only to South Africa’s relations with India. Secondly,
and perhaps more importantly, the Pelindaba Treaty reflects an Africa specific
view on non-proliferation within the context of an African security community.53
The Pelindaba Treaty is in a more general way an important source of law for
African states that should trump or be encoded in their domestic legislation once
they have ratified it.
The Pelindaba Treaty, to review, establishes the African Nuclear Weapons Free
Zone (ANWFZ). African states have pursued such a treaty since France tested
nuclear weapons in 1960 in what was then French Algeria. The United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) shortly afterwards adopted Resolution 1652, calling on
all states to ‘consider and respect the African continent as a denuclearized zone’.54
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), at its first summit held in Egypt in 1964,
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adopted the Cairo Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.55 OAU members
expressed their readiness to commit to an Africa free of nuclear weapons through a
treaty, but it was not until three decades later that progress was made towards such a
treaty.
Through these years, South Africa’s domestic policy of apartheid and its
consequent international pariah status was one of the main obstructions to an
ANWFZ. South Africa refused to join the NPT and had developed the capability to
enrich uranium by 1970. South Africa followed a policy of deliberate nuclear
ambiguity similar to that of Israel (with whom the apartheid government had strong
military ties at the time), not admitting or denying that it had nuclear weapons.56
As international outcasts, South African policymakers intended to use nuclear
weapons to blackmail Western states into coming to the country’s rescue should
South Africa ever face a Soviet Union-driven communist ‘onslaught’ by states in
Southern Africa.57 When the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, and in the face of
fierce opposition from a majority of the South African population, the apartheid
government’s anti-communist rhetoric could no longer justify a racially oppressive
regime and negotiations toward a democratic transition began. However, before the
regime changed, the apartheid government proceeded to dismantle its six nuclear
weapons and acceded to the NPT in 1991 as a non-nuclear weapon state. At that
point, the OAU and UN appointed a joint expert group to write the draft text of an
ANWFZ treaty. South Africa joined the OAU in 1994 after its first democratic
elections and, in 1996, the Pelindaba Treaty58 was opened for signature.59 On 15 July
2009, the treaty came into effect with the 28th ratification.60
All 53 African states have signed the treaty, but at the time of writing 22 still
needed to ratify it.61 In some cases states are simply not ratifying the treaty because
of weak governmental structures or internal instability. Arguably this is true for
Somalia. In other cases, the choice to withhold ratification is a political decision.
Egypt, for example, has made acceptance of any further nuclear arms control
measures conditioned on Israel acceding to the NPT as a non- nuclear weapon state
(a point that will be returned to later).62 However, other African states hesitate on
economic grounds. Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
provides the following: ‘A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty . . . until it shall have
made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty.’ Thus, it will be illegal for
signatories to the Pelindaba Treaty, such as Namibia and Niger, to export uranium to
India if the Pelindaba Treaty determines it so.63 Both the letter and spirit of the
Pelindaba Treaty are indicative in this regard.
The letter of Pelindaba
In terms of the letter of the Pelindaba Treaty, Article 9 that relates to ‘Verification of
peaceful uses’ is clear. Each party undertakes:
(a) to conduct all activities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy under strict
non-proliferation measures to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful uses;
(b) to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA for the
purpose of verifying compliance with the undertakings in subparagraph (a) of
this article; and
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(c) not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or
material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production
of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-
weapon state unless subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement
concluded with IAEA.
The article’s intent conforms to non-proliferation norms in general by calling each
party to engage only in the peaceful use of nuclear energy under strict non-
proliferation measures that include comprehensive IAEA safeguards as the verifica-
tion instrument. Article 9(c) conforms to nuclear export restrictions by prohibiting
the transfer of source or special material (even if designed for peaceful purposes) to a
non-nuclear weapon state unless the latter is subject to a comprehensive IAEA
safeguards agreement. Seen in terms of 9(a) and 9(b), 9(c) can be interpreted to codify
the responsibility incumbent on each party not to facilitate, knowingly or unknow-
ingly, the proliferation of nuclear weapons. According to a strict interpretation
of Article 9(c), there is no question of whether it is legal for member states of
the Pelindaba Treaty to engage in nuclear cooperation with India: it most definitely
is not.
However, there is another ‘minimalist’ interpretation of the Pelindaba Treaty,
namely that the type 66 IAEA safeguard agreement with India complies with Annex
II paragraph 3 of the treaty, which refers to the safeguards that member states have
to sign with the IAEA.64 That provision states: ‘For the purpose of this Treaty, the
safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 above shall have as their purpose the
verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities
to nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown.’ If this restricted meaning of a
safeguard agreement is extended to what is expected of recipient states, the India-
specific IAEA safeguard agreement arguably meets this requirement, as it establishes
verification of non-diversion from India’s civil to military programmes. Using this
interpretation to legalise uranium exports to India would however seem rather a
disingenuous attempt to evade Article 9(c)’s explicit prohibition of uranium exports
to states without comprehensive safeguards.
The spirit of Pelindaba
To determine whether uranium exports to India would be in breach of the Pelindaba
Treaty, it is also necessary to look at the context of the treaty, which gives insight into
the spirit rather than the letter of the treaty.65 Firstly, the Pelindaba Treaty takes its
cue from other nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) treaties. The object and purpose
of the treaty is firstly to address a regional security issue, in that it ‘is an important
part of the overall peace and security architecture of the African Union: is indeed
one of the building blocks of the Common African Defense and Security
Policy (CADSP)’.66 NWFZs provide common security through a doctrine of
mutually assured abstinence from nuclear weapons, rather than deterrence through
mutually assured destruction by nuclear weapons. Abstinence from acquiring or
developing nuclear weapons is verified under the IAEA safeguards system.
Secondly, the ANWFZ is seen as ‘an integral part of a planned integrated
approach to the Treaty Zones towards disarmament and nuclear non-
proliferation.’67 When the Pelindaba Treaty entered into force, the Southern
Hemisphere became a nuclear weapons free zone (excluding international waters).68
South African Journal of International Affairs 327
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 W
es
ter
n C
ap
e],
 [J
oe
lie
n P
ret
or
ius
] a
t 0
1:5
7 2
2 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
12
 
In fact, when the African Union (AU), the OAU’s successor, entertained an agenda
item on the status of the Pelindaba Treaty in 2006, members were encouraged to
ratify the treaty precisely because its delayed entry into force was seen as the weak
link in a network of NWFZs.69 The integrated approach is founded on the
philosophy that NWFZs are not an end in themselves but a means for achieving a
world without nuclear weapons.70 The focus is not only regional, but how each
NWFZ becomes a building block of the bigger goal. The Pelindaba Treaty reflects
this philosophy in the preamble and protocols where it notes: ‘the need to take all
steps in achieving the ultimate goals of a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, as
well as of the obligation of all States to contribute to this end.’ Although the treaty
emphasises the right to peaceful nuclear technology and its use for the development
of the continent, the overriding spirit of the treaty is clearly to create an African
continent free of nuclear weapons and by doing so to contribute to global nuclear
disarmament.
However, the treaty’s object and purpose are not limited to military security, but
are aligned with what has come to be known as human security, commonly defined
as a situation of ‘freedom from fear and freedom from want’.71 The argument is
based on a human-centred approach to international security that hails the health
and environmental benefits of a NWFZ. The Pelindaba Treaty Preamble claims a
determination ‘to keep Africa free of environmental pollution and other radioactive
waste’,72 and also contributes to human security by promoting mutually assured
abstinence wherein there would be no need to spend resources on costly nuclear
weapon programmes. The notion that NWFZs prevent the use of resources for
military means that could be used for development is commonly expressed. For
example, the Treaty of Tlatelolco explicitly states this conviction in its preamble:
‘Convinced . . . that the military denuclearization of Latin America and the
Caribbean . . . will constitute a measure which will spare their peoples from the
squandering of their limited resources on nuclear armaments . . .’. Similarly,
Ambassador Alfredo Labbe, Director of International and Human Security of
Chile, at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, made the following statement in relation
to NWFZs: ‘We are convinced of the benefit that the use of the resources devoted to
nuclear weapon programs could have for humanity if they were utilized for
supporting social and economic development’.73
The Pelindaba Treaty also claims entitlement to the peaceful use of nuclear
technology for socio-economic development (Article 8(2)), calling for mechanisms of
nuclear cooperation to be established and strengthened. One of the mechanisms
already in existence is the African Regional Cooperation Agreement for Research,
Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA).74
The treaty in this way invokes the ‘grand bargain’ that was made between nuclear
weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states when the NPT was negotiated: the
NPT’s Article IV(1) refers to the ‘inalienable right’ to nuclear energy for peaceful
uses and Article IV(2) obliges states to cooperate to this effect with specific
consideration for the ‘needs of the developing areas of the world’.75 Furthermore, the
Pelindaba Treaty encourages links with other international and continental nuclear
non-proliferation organisations to harness nuclear technology for development.
These organisations include the IAEA, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Organization (CTBTO) and AFRA.
In this respect, it could be argued that IndiaAfrica civilian nuclear cooperation
has the potential to promote the Pelindaba Treaty’s goal of reaping the economic
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benefits of nuclear energy for development. Discussion will return to this point
below, in examining whether uranium mining and exports actually serve to promote
or hinder human security in Africa.
It seems that the interpretation of the Pelindaba Treaty with respect to
normalisation of nuclear trade with India is at this point left open. This can be
attributed to the fact that the treaty entered into force as recently as 2009, and the
member states and civil society groups that encouraged its entry into force do not
want to introduce controversy as yet. Indeed, the verification instrument, the African
Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), was only established in October 2010.
Should African member states prefer a consensus interpretation of the India case,
AFCONE would be the appropriate organ for this discussion. What has transpired,
though, is that Egypt’s linking of its ratification of the treaty to Israel’s signing on
to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state is affecting the development of this
discussion. Egypt is concerned that the India exemption may become a precedent for
normalisation of Israel’s nuclear status, and hence finds the India case problematic.
This has especially come to the fore and informed a more conservative and cautious
approach to India by African states during the NPT Review Conference in 2010. The
position that South Africa is taking on the issue further illustrates its complicated
nature.
South Africa’s position vis-a`-vis India
As the only African NSG member, South Africa’s position warrants special
attention. Not only has South Africa supported the exception that the NSG made
for India, but South African politicians have on several occasions expressed
willingness to engage in civil nuclear cooperation with India, especially in bilateral
visits between the two countries. Moreover, the mooted investment by the NPCIL in
Areva SA would particularly link India to uranium mining in South Africa. However,
it seems that a much more cautious South African approach is emerging towards
nuclear cooperation with India.76 This conclusion is supported by the fact that South
Africa’s nuclear energy legislation prohibits exports to states without full-scope
IAEA safeguards, and no real effort to change this law has emerged since the NSG
waiver was passed in 2008. No bilateral agreement on nuclear cooperation has been
signed between the countries either. A possible explanation for this may be that some
South African officials are of the view that the country’s uranium should be
exploited for its own benefit, and not that of foreign actors’.77
This begs the question, why did South Africa support India in the NSG decision
if it was not intending to take advantage of India’s exemption through nuclear
cooperation with Mumbai? It is not that South Africa lacks in the economic
pragmatism one sees in the case of Namibia. Rather, South Africa’s seemingly
ambivalent position towards normalising nuclear relations with India should be
viewed in its broader context in order to take cognisance of several factors. These
include South Africa’s nuclear past, the current advanced state of its nuclear
technology when compared to other African states, and South Africa’s pursuit of
emerging-state status through membership of the IndiaBrazilSouth Africa
Dialogue Forum (IBSA) and the BrazilRussiaIndiaChinaSouth Africa (BRICS)
group of states.
As already noted, South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons as one of the first
steps in the process of democratic transition. Sceptics may argue that the apartheid
South African Journal of International Affairs 329
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 W
es
ter
n C
ap
e],
 [J
oe
lie
n P
ret
or
ius
] a
t 0
1:5
7 2
2 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
12
 
government of FW de Klerk did so more in anticipation that it would soon be
replaced by a new government under the control of the unpredictable (and largely
black-run) African National Congress (ANC).78 This is a moot point since the ANC
had maintained an explicit non-proliferation stance prior to 1994. At the Conference
on Nuclear Policy for a Democratic South Africa held on 1113 February 1994
(75 days before the first democratic elections), Abdul Minty, the face of the ANC
in exile on these matters, ended his keynote address to the conference as follows:
‘So those who have been abroad working, hope for a free and democratic South
Africa. A South Africa that will not only clean itself, but also play an international
role, both to fight racism abroad, and to stop proliferation and help to produce
peace.’79 Indeed, as the first country to give up its nuclear weapons, South Africa
became somewhat of a ‘disarmament trendsetter’ that could claim the moral high
ground. As a result, South Africa was able to play a key role in negotiating the
indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, and mediated during the 2000 and 2005
NPT Review Conferences as well as being one of the leading states to bring the
Pelindaba Treaty to signature.80 As a major player in the non-proliferation field
compared to other African states (bar Egypt, perhaps), South Africa’s non-
proliferation credentials are also under greater scrutiny. This may explain, in part,
South Africa’s reluctance to normalise nuclear relations with India. Ironically, it is
precisely its high profile that made South Africa’s support of India in the NSG so
significant.81
As a member of IBSA and BRICS, South Africa has to tread lightly and
diplomatically around its emerging power allies. South Africa’s economic clout is not
nearly that of India, Brazil, China or Russia. However, South Africa is allowed entry
to their company on the premise that it is a regional powerhouse in Africa that can
add its political weight to support its bigger allies in international forums, like the
NSG or the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) where South Africa is
currently serving as a non-permanent member (20112012). Despite its non-
proliferation convictions, supporting India was therefore in line with the script
that South Africa has to enact if it wants to keep the company of these emerging
powers.82
Although the South African position reflects the tension between economic
pragmatism and non-proliferation imperatives, it also illustrates issues of a post-
colonial (or anti-imperialist) identity that not only informs South Africa’s foreign
policy, but is observable more generally in the African position on this issue. This is
the subject of the next section.
A common post-colonial consciousness, or a diverging one?
India and African states often invoke their historical and ideological ties, or what this
article refers to as a common post-colonial identity, to justify their increased
economic relationship.83 This post-colonial identity includes a consciousness of
persistent forms of colonisation, interpreting and framing these forms of subjugating
power, and devising methods for their subversion and resistance.84 The Delhi
Declaration that followed from the IndiaAfrica Forum Summit in April 2008
illustrates the discourse framing AfricaIndia relations. The declaration talks about
‘the decades-old partnership and historical and civilizational links between the
African continent and India’ and states in Article 1 and 2: ‘We [Indian and African
heads of state] recognize that Africa and India have undergone enormous positive
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changes, in particular over the last two and half decades, and that Africa and India
have historically been close allies in the struggle for independence, equality, human
rights, freedom and democracy.’ The Summit Declaration of the IndiaAfrica Forum
Summit held in Ethiopia in 2011 repeats these themes, noting that India and Africa
were ‘fraternal partners and allies in the struggle for independence and achievement
of self-determination’ and that there exists a ‘historical understanding amongst our
peoples’.85
The historical and political attachments between India and Africa are embodied
in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), of which the Indian Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru was a founding member along with two African leaders, Ghana’s
former president, Kwame Nkrumah, and Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. The
ideational foundation of the NAM is the common history that members share in
relation to the West, marginalisation, exploitation and underdevelopment (what was
previously labelled a Third World consciousness). There is, however, a danger in
over-romanticising India and Africa’s common post-colonial identity and its
relevance for an interpretation of the Pelindaba Treaty that would legitimise
AfricaIndia nuclear cooperation.
Despite being regarded as a leader of the Developing World and having for most
of the Cold War an exemplary non-aligned foreign policy, India’s interpretation of
post-colonialism seems to have shifted and African leaders’ invocation thereof
demands critical examination, especially when brought to bear on nuclear matters.
Although India still uses its NAM identity when lobbying for its own interests, for
example to garner support from IAEA and NSG members in the run-up to the NSG
decision to exempt India from the comprehensive safeguard requirement in 2008,
Marie Lall argues that India’s policy has shifted.86 This view is also prevalent in the
Indian media, where analysts regard non-alignment as standing in the way of India’s
great power pursuits and its relations with the United States. The following quote
from an Indian newspaper is typical of this view: ‘India today is very different from
the India of the Cold War days. We are now recognised as an emerging economic
power, no longer dependent on the charity of others for our economic progress. In
these circumstances, does it make sense to cling to old shibboleths and slogans such
as ‘‘non-aligned solidarity’’ in a vastly transformed world order?’87
There are other factors that provide evidence for this shift in policy, not least
military cooperation between India and Israel.88 Given Egypt’s concern with Israel’s
nuclear status, the Indo-Israeli relationship will prove problematic for NAM,
possibly reducing future backing for India on nuclear matters. In fact, developments
at the 2010 NPT Review Conference indicated as much: as a non-NPT member,
India was not included in NAM’s preparatory discussions for the Review Conference
or as a part of its delegation. The NAM statement ‘viewed with concern’ nuclear
cooperation agreements with states not under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.89
Although India was not named, the implication of this statement was clear.
African states participated in the NPT Review Conference as part of the NAM bloc.
The NAM position, greatly influenced by Egypt, may put African states in an
increasingly awkward position vis-a`-vis India.
It was noted earlier that the Pelindaba Treaty also seeks to promote human
security through peaceful nuclear cooperation and that normalising IndiaAfrica
nuclear relations has the potential to advance this goal. The article now returns to
this point. A consideration that African states will need to take into account, and one
that India should be aware of and sensitive to, hinges on perceptions among African
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civil societies regarding the increased involvement of China and India on the African
continent. There is concern that these states are engaged in a second ‘scramble for
Africa’.90 Although IndiaAfrica trade has increased significantly over the past
decade, the composition of that trade leans toward African export of primary
commodities to India and African import of manufactured goods from India.
In 2006 more than 80% of African exports to India consisted of oil, gold, nuts,
phosphate chemicals, and copper ore. In turn, India’s exports to Africa are far more
diversified with oil (not crude), medicine, motor vehicles, and rice making up 40% of
exports.91 This does not bode well for the industrialisation and economic growth
figures of African states, reflecting as it does the ‘neo-imperialist traits’ of trade
relations with other developed states. Economists such as Erik Reinert have argued
that specialising in the export of primary products is a significant reason why poor
states remain poor.92 There is also a vast literature that warns against a resource
curse when countries in Africa become dependent on commodity exports without
diversifying their economies.93
Beyond economic development, the health and environmental implications of
uranium mining should also be considered. Gabriella Hecht has done excellent
studies that show how African uranium miners have systematically been excluded
from the safety regimes that set uranium mining apart from other mining endeavours
due to the risk of overexposure to radioactivity.94 The current environmental and
health debates that are restricting Canadian, Australian and Indian uranium mines
are seen by some mining chambers and government officials in Africa as an
opportunity for African uranium supplies to fill the void.95 Should AfricaIndian
nuclear cooperation be normalised, uranium mining and trade must meet the criteria
of contributing to the Pelindaba Treaty’s spirit of promoting human and environ-
mental security, as well as socio-economic development, in the framework of a post-
colonial consciousness. African states have an obligation to set standards to prevent
the negative impacts of uranium mining.
Conclusion
No single African or AU position on the normalisation of nuclear relations with
India can be discerned. There was initial political support for normalising nuclear
relations with India (except from Egypt) driven by potential economic and
technological benefits of such support. This pragmatic approach was also informed
by the notion that if other states (the United States, France, Canada, and more)
are benefitting from the NSG’s India waiver, African states might as well. However,
non-proliferation imperatives as codified in the Pelindaba Treaty and national laws
constrain the normalisation of nuclear trade with India. This article has also argued
that a post-colonial consciousness (Africa’s historical relationship with India, NAM
ties, SouthSouth cooperation) frames the balancing act of these two sets of factors
(economic pragmatism and non-proliferation imperatives). For Niger, for example,
nuclear cooperation with India means reducing its former colonial master’s
hegemony over its uranium sector, letting the weight fall in favour of economic
pragmatism. For Egypt, on the other hand, resisting the normalisation of nuclear
relations with India signifies caution that bending the rules for India may become a
precedent to bend the rules for Israel * an untenable scenario that would be
counterproductive to efforts for a Middle East NWFZ. In Egypt’s case, the weight
thus falls on non-proliferation imperatives. For South Africa, support for India in
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the NSG means alignment with emerging powers, but by not legalising South
African uranium exports to India, Pretoria suggests sensitivity toward a NAM
position deeply influenced by Egypt’s concerns. Thus, it seems South Africa’s is a
hung position.
The findings of this analysis also warrant three more critical conclusions.
Firstly, Egypt’s dual geopolitical location in the Middle East and Africa brings
Middle Eastern geopolitics to bear on African international relations. This is clearly
illustrated by the weight that Egypt’s position has had on African states’ political
support for India on the nuclear issue. Secondly, although it has been argued that a
post-colonial consciousness impacts on the position of African states, India and
African states do not necessarily agree on what it means to be post-colonial. India
chose to remain outside the NPT because it viewed the NPT as a form of nuclear
apartheid that institutionalised a discriminatory nuclear order. India’s incarnation of
post-colonialism after the Cold War increasingly seems to reflect joining the club of
the powerful, rather than being the leader of the ‘weak’. This sense of India’s rightful
place at ‘the table’ drives the pursuit to become a recognised nuclear weapon state.
In sharp contradiction, the joint NAM declaration at the NPT Review Conference in
2010 makes it clear that enlarging the club of ‘nuclear haves’ does not solve the
problem of an unfair nuclear order.
Finally, in the light of India’s interpretation of post-colonialism, the article ends
with a cautionary note that it would be in the interest of African leaders to move
beyond a romanticised notion of a common non-aligned identity with India, and
develop a comprehensive understanding of the health, environmental and economic
implications of increased uranium mining and exports to India, before they enter
into agreements with India. If signatories to the Pelindaba Treaty see fit to evade the
explicit prohibition on trade with non-nuclear weapon states (which India remains
per the NPT definition) without an IAEA comprehensive safeguard agreement,
the treaty’s emphasis on human security should, at least, be taken seriously.
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